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ABSTRACT
We construct a dynamic, two-country model of trade and growth in which
endogenous technological progress results from the profit-maximizing behavior
of entrepreneurs. We study the role that the external trading environment
and that trade and industrial policies play in the determination of long-run
growth rates. We find that cross-country differences in efficiency at R&D
versus manufacturing (i.e. comparative advantage) bear importantly on the
growth effects of economic structure and commercial policies. Our analysis
allows for both natural and acquired comparative advantage, and we discuss
the primitive determinants of the latter.
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Woodrow Wilson School Department of Economics
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ISRAELI Introduction
What role do the external trading environment and commercial policy play
in the determination of lona-run economic performance? This central question
of international economics has received surprisingly little attention in the
theoretical literature over the years.
Previous research on trade and growth has adopted the neoclassical
framework to focus on factor accumulation in the open economy. (See the
surveys by Findlay (1986) and Smith (1984)). This research largely neglects
the effects of trade structure on rates of growth, however, addressing instead
the reverse causation from growth and accumulation to trade patterns.' The
direction that the research followed almost surely can be ascribed to the
well-known property of the standard neoclassical growth model with diminishing
returns to capital that (endogenous) growth in per capita income dissipates in
the long run. For this reason, the familiar models which incorporate
investment only in capital equipment seem ill-suited for analysis of long-run
growth.
The available evidence collected since the seminal work of Solow (1957)
also leads one to look beyond capital accumulation for an explanation of
growth. Exercises in growth-accounting for a variety of countries generally
find that increases in the capital to labor ratio account for considerably
less than half of the last century's growth in per capita incomes.2 Although
econometric efforts to explain the residual have been somewhat disappointing,
(see e.g. Criliches (1979)) professional opinion and common sense continue to
I An exception is Corden (1971), who studies how the opening up of trade
affects the speed of transition to the steady state in a two-factor
neoclassical growth model with fixed savings propensities.
2 See Maddison (1987) for a recent, careful exercise in growth
accounting.2
impute much of this residual to improvements in technology.3 We share the
view, expressed by Romer (1986, 1988), that a full understanding of growth n
the long run requires appreciation of the economic determinants of the
accumulation of knowledge.
In this paper, we draw on the pioneering work by Rorner to construct a
model that highlights the roles of economies of scale and technological
progress in the growth process. As in Romer's work, our model implies an
endogenous rate of long-run growth in per capita income, and we study its
economic determinants. Our primary contribution lies in casting the growth
process in a two-country setting. We provide, for the first time, a rigorous
analysis linking long-run growth rates to trade policies and other
international economic conditions. Moreover, we find that recognition of
cross-country differences in economic structure impinges upon conclusions
about the long-run effects of domestic shocks and policies.
Our model incorporates the essential insights from Romer (1988) ,although
we introduce some differences in detail. The building blocks are an P&D
sector that produces designs or blueprints for new products using primary
resources and previously accumulated knowledge, an intermediate-goods sector
consisting of oligopolistic producers of differentiated products, and a
consumer goods sector in each country that produces a country-specific final
output using labor and intermediate inputs. As in Ethier (1982), total factor
productivity in final production increases when the number of available
varieties of differentiated inputs grows. Thus, resources devoted to R&D
The benefits of education and experience undoubtedly contribute part of
the explanation for the growth residual. See, for example, Lucas (1988) and
Becker and Murphy (1988) for growth models that highlight the role of human
capital accumulation as a source of growth.3
contribute over time to productivity in the production of final goods, as well
as to the stock of scientific and engineering knowledge.
The new elements in our analysis stem from the assumed presence of cross-
country differences in the effectiveness with which primary resources can
perform different activities; i.e. comparative advantage. For simplicity we
specify a one-primary-factor model, and allow the productivity of this factor
in the three activities to vary internationally. We suspect thst similar
results could be derived from a multi-factor model with inter-industry
differences in factor intensities. In any event, we find that many
comparative dynamic results hinge on a comparison across countries of
efficiency in R&D relative to efficiency in manufacturing the goods that make
use of the knowledge generated by R&D, namely middle products. The effects of
policy in a single country, of accumulation of primary resources in a single
country, and of a shift in world tastes toward the final output of one of the
countries all depend upon the identity of the country in which the change
originates in relation to the international pattern of comparative advantage.
We provide a more complete verbal description of the economic setting,
followed by a formal statement of the model, in Section II immediately below.
Then, in Section III, we derive the dynamic equilibrium of the world economy,
discuss conditions under which there exists a steady-state equilibrium with
positive growth of per capita income, and calculate two reduced-form equations
that determine the steady-state growth rate. In Section IV we investigate the
structural determinants of long-run growth. There, the implications for
growth of variations in consumer preferences, primary-input coefficients in
one or both countries, and stocks of available primary resources are
considered. Section V contains policy analysis. We study barriers and4
inducements to trade in consumer goods and subsidies to research and
development. Then, in Section VI, we introduce an important elaboration of
the model. There we extend the analysis to incorporate lags in the
dissemination of knowledge and asymmetries in the speed of diffusion within
and between countries. We use the extended model to reconsider the effects of
trade policies on the steady-state rate of growth. Finally. Section VII
provides a brief summary of our findings.
Before proceeding, a brief disclaimer may be in order. Our results
in this paper concern steady-state rates of growth. Because we perform steady
state comparisons and also because growth rates have no immediate implications
for discounted utility, we do not mean to confer upon our findings any
normative interpretation. We do hope to report on the welfare properties of
our model in a future article.
II. The Model
A.General Description
In Figure 1 we provide a schematic representation of our model. We study
a world economy comprising two countries. Each country engages in three
productive activities: the production of a final good, the production of
varieties of differentiated middle products (i.e., intermediate inputs), and
research and development (R&D). The two final goods are imperfect
substitutes, and both are demanded by consumers worldwide. A single primary
factor is used in production, and is taken to be in fixed and constant supply
in each country. Although we refer to this factor as "labor, we have in mind
an aggregate of irreproducible resources that for any given level of
technical know-how limits aggregate output.5
We follow Romer (1988) in assuming that R&D generates two distinct
outputs. First, as in our earlier paper (Grossman and Fielpean, 1988; see also
Judd, 1985). research effort produces "blueprints" for new products. The
returns to this component of R&D output, coming in the form of an infinite
stream of monopoly profits, are assumed to be perfectly avoroprieble by the
originator due either to perfect and indefinite patent protection or technical
barriers to imitation. Blueprints are not tradable, so the manufacture of
each middle product takes place in the country in which it was developed.
Second. R&D contributes to the stock of disembodied knowledge. Knowledge
here includes all general scientific information, as well as some forms of
engineering data with more widespread applicability, generated in the course
of developing marketable products. Knowledge contributes to the productivity
of further research efforts, by reducing the amount of labor needed for an
inventor to develop a new product. Due to the more general and non-
patentable nature of this product of the R&D effort, appropriation of the
resulting returns by the creator becomes problematic. We assume to begin with
that general knowledge disseminates immediately and costlessly throughout the
world. This approximates a situation in which information spreads through
technical journals, professional organizations, and interpersonal commercial
contacts, and where literature, scientists, and businessmen move freely across
international borders (see Pasinetti, 1981, ch.ll). We relax this assumption
by introducing lags in the dissemination of knowledge in Section VI.
Once developed, middle products are manufactured with labor alone under
conditions of constant returns to scale. These products are freely traded
between the countries. The middle products, along with labor, serve as inputs
into the production of the final goods in each country. Given the number of6
available varieties, the production function for each of the final goods
exhibits constant returns to scale. But an increase in the number of
varieties of middle products used as inputs raises total factor productivity.
This specification, which we borrow from Ethier (1982), captures the notion
that an increasing degree of specialization generates technical efficiency
gains. In effect, the economy's potential for augmenting the degree of
specialization by developing new middle products implies the existence of
dynamic scale economies at the industry level that are external to the
individual final-good-producing firms.
At each point in time, competitive producers of final goods earn zero
profits. Patent holders for middle products engage in oligopolistic
competition, earning monopoly rents. Forward-looking entrepreneurs in each
country elect to devote resources to R&D if the present discounted value of
future profits exceeds the current cost of development. Free entry into R&D
ensures that this activity earns at most a competitive return. Finally,
consumers maximize intertemporal utility, with savings devoted to the
acquisition of corporate bonds or ownership claims in input-producing firms.
We assume that financial capital is internationally mobile, although many of
our results also hold in the absence of international borrowing and lending.
We shall study the dynamic evolution of this world economy. Over time,
the number of available varieties of middle products grows, affecting both
profitability in the intermediate-goods sector and productivity in the final
goods sector. The stock of technical knowledge also expands, reducing the
resource cost of inventive activity. Under certain conditions, the world
economy approaches a steady-state rate of growth of per-capita income, the
determinants of which are the focus of our attention in Sections IV and V.7
We turn now to the formal specification of the model.
B.Consumers
Consumers worldwide share identical, homotlietic preferences. We
represent these preferences by a time-separable intertemporal utility function
(1) U —fett) log u[y1(r),y2(r)Jdi-
where p is the subjective discount rate and y1(r) is consumption of final
goods from country i in period r. The instantaneous sub-utility function u()
is non-decreasing, strictly quasi-concave and positively linearly homogeneous.
A typical consumer maximizes (1) subject to an intertemporal budget
constraint, which requires that the present value of all future expenditures
not exceed the present value of factor income plus the market value of current
asset holdings. With u(S) linearly homogenous, this problem can be solved in
two stages. First, the consumer maximizes static utility for a given level of
expenditure at time r, E(r). The solution to this sub-problem generates an
indirect utility function, v(p11(r),p12(r)JE(r). where pyj is the price of y1.
In the absence of barriers to trade in final goods, these prices are common to
consumers in the two countries. The second-stage problem now can be
formulated as one of choosing the time pattern of expenditures to maximize
(2) Vt —C e_5(t_t)(logv(p1(r).p52(r)J +logE(r)1 dr
subject to
(3) fe(t)IE(r)￿fe (t)_s(t)Jw(y)Ldr + Z(t)8
where R(t) is the cumulative interest factor from time 0 to time t (R(O)—l).
w(r) is the consumer's wage rate at time r,Lis his labor supply, and Z(t) is
the value of his time t asset holdings. The interest factor in (3) is common
to all individuals as a result of trade on the integrated world capital
market, but the wage rate may vary across countries, with residents of country
I receiving w1(r).
From the first-order conditions to this problem, we see that the optimal
path for expenditure obeys
(4)
Savings are used to accumulate either ownership claims in input-producing
firms or riskLess bonds issued by these same firms.4 Arbitrage ensures that
the rates of return on these two assets are equal, and in equilibrium
consumers are indifferent as to the composition of their portfolios.
C. Producers
At a point in time, output of final goods in country I is given by
—gj1;ø[fx(w)aw]&,
0 < a. < 1,
where L represents employment in the final goods sector. x(w) denotes the
input of middle product w, and n is (the measure of) the number of varieties
Firms that produce final goods earn zero profits, hence their stock
market value is nil. Input-producing firms command a market value equal to
the discounted value of their future operating profits.9
of middle products available at that time.5 Notice that the production
functions are the same for both countries except for the productivity
parameter A. This productivity parameter may represent differencesin
technology or in the endowments of sector-specific inputs.
Competition in this sector ensures marginal-cost pricing. Hence, by




wherep5(w) is the price of variety ,.Final-goodproducers worldwide pay the
same prices for (freely traded) middle products.
At every moment in time the existing producers of middle products engage
in oligopolistic competition. Each producer takes as given the prices of his
rivals, as well as the outputs and prices of final goods. The producer of a




where is the unit labor requirement for production of intermediates in
country i. This expression for profits comprises the product of profits per
unit (in square brackets) and derived demand for variety w, where the latter
incorporates the assumption that neither prices nor volumes of final
production vary with p5(o). The first-order condition for a profit maximum
5 Here, and henceforth, we omit time arguments when no confusion is
caused by doing so.10
implies the usual fixed-markup pricing rule,
(6) ap5(w) —
Itis clear from (6) that varieties originating from the same country
bear the same price. Letting Pxj represent the price of a variety produced in
country i and n1 be the number of intermediate inputs produced there,
equations (5) and (6) imply
(1) — ()10 np1')
(8) —
Withtheseprices, profits per firm can be expressed as
(9) —(l-a)p1X1/n1
whereis aggregate output of intermediatesin country i (n times per-firm




Thenumber of intermediates produced in country i evolves over time
according to the amount of R&D that takes place there. If resources are
devoted to R&D in country i at time t, then the present value of future11
operating profits -- discountedto time t -- mustbe equal to the current cost
of R&D, denoted by c(t). We write this analog to the zero-profit condition
of static, monopolistic-competition models as
ett)R(t)Js(r)dr — c1(t)




Equation(11) expresses a standard no-arbitrage condition. Recognizing that
c1(t) represents the value of an input-producing firm in country i at time t,
(11) equates the instantaneous rate of return on shares in such a firm (the
aiim of dividends and capital gains) to the rate of interest.
As we have discussed above, R&D produces a joint output; new varieties of
middle products and additions to the stock of knowledge. if L units of
labor engage in research in country i. they generate a flow of new products
n given by
(12) —
whereK is the current stock of knowledge and a,1 is a country-specific
productivity parameter. We assume until Section VI that the by-product
contribution to knowledge occurs instantaneously and that diffusion is
worldwide. Also, we take the stock of knowledge to be proportional to
cumulative experience in R&D; i.e. •thereare no diminishing returns to12
research in adding to scientific understanding. 8y choosing units for K so
that the factor of proportionality is unity, we have K—n and
(13) K —1
Finally, since knowledge is a free input to each individual entrepreneur, the
Cost of product development in country i can be written as
(14) c, —w1a1/n
This completes our description of the model.
III. Eouilibriuin Dynamics
During the course of the development of our model in the previous
section, we provided some of the equilibrium conditions. For example, we
derived pricing equations for goods and a no-arbitrage condition relating
equilibrium asset returns. In this section we complete the list of
equilibrium requirements by adding conditions that stipulate market clearing
in factor and final-goods markets. We then derive and discuss a reduced-form
system that describes equilibrium dynamics.
Static equilibrium in the markets for the two final goods implies
(15) pY —sE
where sj(py1,p2) is the share of world spending allocated to Y and E is
world spending on consumer goods. The share function is, of course,13
homogenous of degree zero. We establish below that relative commodity prices
are constant in the vicinity of a steady state with active R&Dsectorsin both
countries. For this reason, we take s to be constant in our subsequent
analysis, and omit its functional dependence on relative prices.6
The labor-market clearing conditions equate labor supply and labor demand
in each country. Using (7) and Shephard's lemma, we see that final-goods
producers demand (l-$)p5Y/w workers. The demand for labor by middle-
products producers is while (12) and the fact that K—n imply demand
for labor by product developers of (aj/n)n. Hence.
(16) (ath/n)nj + aLXj + (l-fl)p5Y/w1 —
whereL is the labor force available in countryt.
Since we neglect here the monetary determinants of the price level, we
may choose freely a time pattern for one nominal variable, it proves
convenient to specify the numeraire as follows:
(l7a) Pxi— n(a1/a1)11
We show in Appendix A via equations (8)-(ll) and (14) that, with this
normalization, a necessary condition for convergence to a steady state with
positive R&D in both countries (i.e., non-specialization) is
(17b) PX2 —
6Of course, if u(S) takes a Cobb-Douglas form, then expenditure shares
are independent of relative prices in any equilibrium.14
Together, (Va) and (17b) imply that relative prices of middle products are
constant along the convergent path, which further implies with (8) the
constancy of relative wages, and with (7) the constancy of relative prices of
finalgoods. This last fact justifies our treatment of expenditure shares as
constants.
Letgdenote the rate of growth of the number of products and the stock
of knowledge; i.e., g—n/n—K/K. Then from (17) and (8) we see chat prices of
intermediates and wages grow at rate g. while from (14), product development






whereb —(athj/aj)m.The coefficients b will serve as our measures of
comparative advantage. Country 1 enjoys comparative advantage in conducting
R&Difand only if b1 <b2.
Since wages grow at the same rate as n, it proves convenient to define
e—E/n. Letting a—n/n be the share of products manufactured in country i and
noting that g—En/n, (16), (15), (17), (8), and (18) imply
(20)
where we have defined }I.ZLI/athl, the total effective labor force, cEcb1.15
a weighted average of the comparative advantage parameters with product shares
as weights, and Observe that the parameter a, which provides a
useful sJmmary of the static intersectoral resource allocation, grows
(shrinks) over time if and only if the growth rate of the numberofdiffer-
entiated middle products in the country with comparative disadvantare in R&D
exceeds(falls short of) that of the other country.
We are now prepared to derive two equations that describe the dynamic
evolutionof the world economy. From the definition of e, we have c/c —
E/E-g.or, substituting (6). (19), and (20),
e + seH
'.' aO a
Hence, the rate of increase of spending per middle product is larger the
greater is spending per product and the smaller is the share of the country
with comparative disadvantage in R&Dinthe total number of varieties.
Now, from the definition of the product shares a, their rates of change
are given by a/oj —nj/nj - n/n.Using (16) together with (17), (8), (18),
and (20), we obtain
(22)
where h—L/a.j is effective labor in country i. and Since the
evolution of the two product shares are related by Eo—O, we can replace (22)




Equations(21) and (23) constitute an autonomous system of differential
equations in e and a. The solution to this system, together with (3), (20),
and the definition of a, provide a complete description of the evolution of
spending and the number of products in each country. From these, the paths
for outputs, employments and final-goods prices are easily derived. Thus, we
shall use this two-equation system to analyze equilibrium dynamics.
Equations <21) and (23) do not apply if the steady state falls outside
the shaded region in Figure 2; i.e., a must lie between the smaller and larger
of the b1s, while the growth rate must fall between zero and p. A negative
growth rate is impossible, because the number of blueprints cannot decline.
And a steady-state growth rate in excess of the subjective rate of discount
would imply unbounded utility and thus invalidate our use of (4) in describing
the evolution of spending. The shape of the iso-growth-rate curves
(increasing and concave) follows from (20). We limit our attention to
economies with parameter configurations that ensure a steady state in the
interior of the shaded area.7
Contrary to the impression given by the figure. the likelihood of
reaching a steady state in the indicated region does not depend directly on
the spread between b1 and b2. This point is seen most clearly by considering
7 A further restriction that we have not explicitly taken into account to
this point is that product development must be non-negative in each country.
This condition certainly is satisfied in the neighborhood of a steady-state
equilibrium with positive growth, but it need not hold all along the con-
vergent path to such an equilibrium. Thus, strictly speaking, the equilibrium
dynamics that we describe below apply for sure only in the vicinity of a
steady state.17
the case in which neither country enjoys comparative advantage in R&D, a case
that is of some interest in its own right. When b1—b—b, the shaded area
collapses to the vertical line segment between points 1 and 2 in Figure 3.
However, in this case, h—bH and s—I/b, which implies via (23) that a—O for
a—b. irrespective of the value of e. When considerations of comparative
advantage are absent, any intersection of the two curves inevitably falls
within the horizontal width" of the relevant region.
Consider next the shape and location of the curve depicting stationary
points for e. We draw the e—0 locus as increasing and concave (see (21)). To
understand the positive slope of this curve, observe from (19) that the
interest rate can be expressed as
(24) P. —fle/o(e-l)
Comparing (24) and (20), we see that an increase in spending per product
increases the interest rate and reduces the rate of growth of n (the former
because the profitability of R&D rises with derived demand, the latter because
more spending means less savings and hence less investment). Since an
increase in the interest rate raises the rate of growth of nominal spending,
and the rate of growth of e is just the difference between the rates of growth
of E and n, it follows that an increase in e raises the growth rate of e. To
compensate for this acceleration in spending per product, if e is to be
stationary, a must rise. An increase in a lowers the interest rate and raises
the rate of growth of n, thereby reducing the rate of growth of e.
In the figure, the e—0 curve intersects the a—O line at point 3, which
lies between points I and 2. Clearly, there are many constellations of18
parametersvalues that admit a steady state with g in the permissible range.
In the figure. we also indicate with arrows the direction of the system's
movement. Point 3 is seen to be unstable. The intertemporal budget
constraint can only be satisfied with equality if the initial value of e
corresponds to the ordinate of point 3. Hence, in this case of no comparative
advantage. e jumps immediately to its long-run value, and the world economy
remains always in a steady state.
Now let us reintroduce comparative advantage. We distinguish two sub-
cases depending on the relative sizes of h/H and 1/s. It can be shown that
h/H >1/sif and only if (b2-b1)(h2b2/s2 -h1b1/s1)>0.If the shares of the
two countries' final outputs are in proportion to their relative effective
labor forces, then the second inequality will be satisfied. But a bias in
size relative to budget share of final output can reverse the inequality and
thus the relationship between h/H and 1/s. We consider the alternative cases
in turn.
Figure 4 depicts equilibrium dynamics when I/s >h/H.Both I/s and h/H
mustlie between and b,. The 0—0curvehere is everywhere downward
sloping,crosses the horizontal axis at h/H, andis discontinuous at u—I/s.
The slope of the curve is understood as follows.For o—o, we must have o—O,
whichrequires that the resources available for R&D in each country be just
sufficient to preserve the country's shate in the world's number of varieties.
Consider country 1 and suppose for concreteness that this country has com-
parative advantage in R&D. Then an increase in a lowers o. thereby reducing
the resources needed for production of middle products. The fall in o also
reduces the amount of R&D country I must perform to preserve its share in the
number of products. Ceterus naribus, o would tend to rise. An increase in19
e, on the other hand, diverts resources away frous R&D to production of middle
and final products in country I. But it also causes the world's rate of
product growth to fall, thereby diminishing the amount of R&Dcountry1 must
undertake to maintain its share of middle products. The relative magnitudes
of these two effects depend uponcountryl's relative size, and on the share
of its final product in aggregate spending. In the case under consideration,
the second effect dominates, and so the o—O curve slopes downward.
In this case, there exists a unique steady-state point, labelled I in the
figure. For initial values of a not too different from that at point 1, a
unique trajectory (saddle-path) converges to the steady state. This
trajectory, labelled SS, fulfills all equilibrium requirements and satisfies
the intertesiporal budget constraint with equality. Along this trajectory (in
the vicinity of the steady state), the interest rate and profit rate are
declining (see (24)) and nominal expenditure E is rising. If the country with
comparative advantage initially has a share of products that is smaller
(larger) than its steady-state share, expenditure rises more slowly (rapidly)
than the number of products.
The second case arises when h/H >1/s.Then the a—U schedule slopes
upward, as depicted in Figure 5.If the curve intersects the c—U locus in the
positive orthant at all, it must intersect it twice, as at points I and 2.8
The lower point (point 1) represents the steady state with the higher rate of
growth (growth rates increase as we move down along the e—O schedule, as we
demonstrate below) and indeed the growth rate corresponding to point 2 may be
8 The geometry supports this claim, once we recognize that the a—O curve
asymptotes to the horizontal line at aH/s(l-). whereas the e—O curve
asymptotes to the horizontal line at a(H+p)/s(l-fl). The algebra provides
confirmation, as simple manipulation reveals that the steady-state growth rate
solves a quadratic equation.20
negative. More importantly, as we show in Appendix B, the equilibrium at
point 1 exhibits saddle-path stability, whereas that at point 2 is locally
unstable.9 To the right of point I, the saddle-path leading to that point
remains trapped in the area bounded by the e—0 locus and the line segment
joining points 1 and 2, and is everywhere upward sloping. Thus, the
qualitative properties of the dynamic trajectory that leads to a stable,
positive-growth equilibrium in Figure S mimic those of the stable saddle-path
in Figure 4.
For the remainder of this paper, we shall restrict our discussion to
stable steady-state equilibria with positive growth rates. That is, we focus
our attention on equilibria such as those at the points labelled 1 in Figures
4 and 5. In the steady state there occurs intra-industry trade in middle
products and inter-industry trade in consumer goods, with the long-run pattern
of trade determined by comparative advantage, productivities in the tim final-
goods industries, and consumer preferences.
IV. Determinants of Lone-Run Crowth
Ourmodelgenerates an endogenous rate of long-run growth. We now are
prepared to explore how economic structure and economic policy affect this
growth rate. In this section, we derive the implications of sectoral
productivity levels, country sizes and demand composition for the steady-state
We strongly suspect, however, that whenever there exist two positive-
growth, steady-state equilibria in the admissible range, there also exists a
third (saddle-path stable) steady-state equilibrium with zero growth. We have
established the existence of such an equilibrium for some parameter values,
but so far have been unable to construct a general existence proof. Since the
equilibrium at point 1 in Figure 5 can only be reached if the initial value of
o is less than that at point 2, we suspect that initial values of a in excess
of that at point 2 (and perhaps only these) imply convergence to a steady
state with zero growth.21
growth rate. The influence of trade policies and of subsides to R&D are
treated in the next section.
We calculate the steady-state values, and a, from the following pair of




Whenever1/s >h/H,these equations provide at most one solution for (i,)
consistentwith g >0.When 1/s <h/H,there may be two such solutions, in
which case we select the stable equilibrium; i.e., the one with the smaller
values for e and a. Stability implies, in this latter case, that the c—0
curve intersects the e—O curve from below (see Appendix B). We make use of
this condition, namely
(27) _______ oH-(1-fl)sè for 1/s <h/H
(H+p)&2 aM -h
in signing the comparative-dynamics derivatives below.
The growth rate of the number of varieties in the steady-state
equilibrium can be derived from the solution to (25) and (26), together with
(15). From this, we can easily calculate the growth rate of output. In the
steady state nominal expenditure grows at rate ,while(7) implies that Pyj
grows at rate 1 -/(1-Eflg.From these facts and (15), we deduce that final
Output grows at rate flg/(l-).
It is worth noting at this point that the steady-state equations (25) and22
(26), as well as the equation for g, do not rely on our assumption of perfect
capital mobility. In the absence of capital mobility, the steady state would
be the same as long as consumers worldwide share identical preferences (and
therefore common subjective discount rates)1°
it Is instructive to begin the discussion with the case in which neither
country exhibits comparative advantage in conducting R&D; I.e., b1—b2—b. As
we noted in Section III, this case has h—bH and s—l/b. Then (25) and (26)
provide a unique solution for e and ;,whichupon substitution into (20).
yields the long-run growth rate
(28) —______ -
Thisequilibrium growth rate shares much in common with that derived by Romer
(1988) for a closed economy. In particular, the growth rate rises with
effective labor H and declines with the subjective discount rate. Our
measure of effective labor adjusts raw labor for productivity in R&D (recall
that H—L1/a), so greater effectiveness in research In either country, as
well as a larger world labor force, necessarily mean faster growth. Long-run
growth does not, however, depend upon coefficients that determine absolute
productivity in the intermediate or final goods sectors (such as A or arn).
Nor do properties of the instantaneous utility function u(), including the
product composition of final demand, play any role in the determination of g.
As we shall see presently, all these features (except for the absence of an
10 The cases of perfect and imperfect capital mobility do differ in their
implications for the steady-state share of each country in aggregate spending
E. However, as should be clear from (25) and (26). the cross-country compo-
sition of E does not matter for the issues taken up In the present section.23
effect of A1 on g) are special to a world without any comparative advantage.
Consider next the case with 1/s > h/H. The curves e—O and c—U in Figure
6 describe the initial situation, with a unique initial steady state at point
1. Now suppose that preferences change so that s increases. This corresponds
to a shift in tastes in favor of the final good produced by the country with
comparative advantage in perfonsing R&D. From (25), we see that the e—0 curve
shifts down, say to e'—O in the figure. Equation (26) implies that the o—O
schedule shifts out (in the positive orthant) to a'—O. The new steady state
occurs at a point such as 2. But observe that all points on e'—O to the right
of its intersection with ray OR are characterized by slower steady-state




Sincethe intersection of o'—O and e'—O necessarily lies to the right of the
intersection of the latter curve with OR, we have established that an increase
in s reduces steady-state growth.
When tastes shift unexpectedly toward the final good of the country with
comparative advantage in R&D, resources there must be reallocated to satisfy
the relatively higher consumer demand. A process begins whereby labor there
shifts out of R&D and the manufacture of middle products. Products accumulate
more slowly in this country than in the other, and over time its share of
middle products falls (i.e., a rises). Output per middle product changes by
the same proportion in both countries (see (18)).So, in the new steady
state, the country with comparative disadvantage in R&D is responsible for s
relatively larger share of the world's innovation, with adverse consequences24
for the common steady-state growth rate, Of course, the opposite conclusion
applies when s falls. Moreover, the same results obtain at stable equilibrium
points when I/s <h/H)"We have thus proven:
Proposition 1: Stronger relative demand for the final good of the country with
comparative advantage in R&Dlowersthe long-run share of this country in the
number of middle products and slows long-run growth of the world economy. In
the absence of comparative advantage in R&D, the long-run growth rate is
independent of the relative demand for final goods.
Next we consider the dependence of growth on the sizes of the effective
labor forces. Effective labor may grow without affecting cross-country
comparative advantage either because the stock of irreproducible resources
expands, or because the productivity of labor in all uses (or in R&D and
intermediate-good production) rises equiproportionately. In the first
experiment. suppose that both countries experience equiproportionate, once-
and-for-all increases in the sizes of their effective labor forces. We have
already seen that this change would augment world growth in the absence of
comparative advantage. Now H and h both rise, with their ratio unchanged. We
illustrate in Figure 7 the resulting impacts on the long-run equilibrium for
the case in which 1/s >h/H.The increase in H shifts the e—O curve up to
e'—O.Once again we draw the ray OR through point 1. along which do is
equal to its initial long-run level. Comparing points I and 2 (where the
latter is the intersection of e'—O with OR), we see from (25) that expenditure
11 In this case the o—O curve rotates to the right in the relevant
region.25
per product differs by de—adil/s(l-fi). Since in the comparison of these two
points. do—ode/c. we find e higher in percentage terms at point 2 by
d.c dHoH dli —H(l-fl)se H
-
Theinequality stems from the fact that the o—O curve intersects the vertical
axis at ah/(l-fi) and h/H C 1/s. The implication we wish to highlight is that
in moving from point 1 to a point such as 3 (which has the same ordinate as
point 2). the proportionate expansion of expenditure per product exceeds that
of the world's effective labor force.
Now, from (26), the global expansion of the world's labor force also
shifts up the o—O curve. The vertical shift of this curve exceeds that of the
e—O locua (compare (25)), and indeed is exactly equal to dR/H. So the
intersection of the new a—0 schedule (not drawn) with the vertical line
through point I must fall above point 4 but below point 3. This implies.
finally, that the new steady-state point lies on e'—O between points 2 and 4.
For all these points, a is higher than at point I, and --sincethe new point
is above OR -- sois the growth rate.
Figure 8 depicts the case in which 1/s C h/H. Again in this case, an
equiproportionate increase in the effective labor forces of the two countries
accelerates growth, although here the share of products in the country with
comparative advantage in R&D rises. To verify these claims, note that the
o'—O locus lies above the o—O curve in proportion to the increase in H. The
new e—O schedule (not drawn) intersects the vertical line through point 1
below point I' .Consequently,the new steady-state equilibrium occurs at a
point such as 2, to the left of point I and above the ray OR. This proves26
Proposition 2: An equtproportionate. once-and-for-all increase in the
effective Labor forces of both countries accelerates long-run growth. The
middle-product share of the country with comparative advantage in R&D rises if
and only if I/s < h/H.
The interesting aspect of this proposition concerns the case where
uniform expansion of effective labor reduces the share in world R&D of the
country that is the relatively more efficient innovator. We have shown that,
even in this case, where the market-share effect certainly is detrimental to
world growth, the direct growth-augmenting effect of a greater resource base
dominates. Greater resources generate higher growth rates in our model
essentially because dynamic scale economies characterize long-run production.
We investigate next the effects of an increase in the effective labor
force of a single country. Conceptually, it proves convenient to decompose
this change into two elements. First, we increase h and H by the same
percentage amount equal to the product of the share of the expanding country
in the world's effective stock of labor and the percentage increase in
effective labor force that this country experiences. This accounts for the
total percentage change in H when H changes. Then we adjust h with H fixed
to arrive at the appropriate change in h.
As an intermediate step, let us consider the effects of an increase in h
alone. This corresponds to an increase in the effective labor of the country
with comparative disadvantage in R&D. and a decrease in the effective labor of
the other, so that the sum remains constant. This imaginary reshuffling of
the world's resources shifts the a—U schedule upward when 1/s >h/H.and27
downwardotherwise. In either case, the e—O curve is unaffected and the new
steady-state point lies on this curve to the right of the original point.
Noting (29), this establishes
Leia 1: A reallocation of resources between countries that maintains a
constant world stock of effective labor raises the long-run growth rate and
increases the long-run product share of the relatively R&D efficient country
if and only if the share of this country in effective labor increases.
When the effective labor force of only country I (say) increases, h rises
by proportionately more or less than H, according to whether country 1 has
comparative disadvantage or advantage in R&D.Ifcountry 1 has comparative
advantage in R&D. then both the uniform increase in H and h and the adjustment
(lowering) of h, that together comprise the effect of an increase in H, serve
to accelerate world growth. Rut if country I has comparative disadvantage in
R&D,thetwoeffectswork in opposite directions. The increase in resources,
by Proposition 2, speeds growth; but the reallocation of given resources, by
Lemma 1, slows growth. The net effect is ambiguous, as the examples that we
present in Appendix D serve to demonstrate. We have established:
Proposition 3: The long-run growth rate is higher the larger is the effective
labor force of the country with comparative advantage in R&D. A larger
effective labor force in the country with comparative disadvantage in R&D may
be associated with faster or slower growth, depending upon the extent of
productivity differences. In the absence of comparative advantage, long-run
growth is faster the larger is the effective labor force of either country.28
These results suggest that findings reported by Krugman (1988) may be
somewhat special. A country need not enjoy faster growth by joining the
integrated world economy, if the country enjoys substantial comparative
advantage in R&D. Moreover, growth in resources or improvements in the
productivity of existing resources do not guarantee faster long-run growth in
a world equilibrium with free trade. If resources expand orbecomemore
efficient in the country with comparative disadvantage in R&D, then the
resulting intersectoral reallocation of resources worldwide might slow
innovation and growth everywhere.
V. Economic Policy
In this section we discuss the effects of tariffs, export subsidies, and
R&Dsubsidieson long-run growth. In order to do so. it is necessary for us
to introduce the relevant policy parameters into the equations that describe
instantaneous and steady-state equilibrium. To avoid repetition of the
detailed arguments presented in Section II, we present here only the necessary
modifications of the model, and then explain their implications for the
steady-state conditions. We restrict attention to small taxes and subsidies;
this restriction facilitates exposition, as the channels through which
economic policies affect long-run growth can be seen more clearly. We also
confine our analysis of trade policies to those that impede (or encourage)
trade in final goods.
The introduction of taxes and subsidies to the model necessitates
consideration of the government's budget. As usual, we assume that the
government collects and redistributes net revenue by lump-sum taxes and29
subsidies. In a static framework, this specification suffices to determine
completely the government's budgetary policy. But in a dynamic framework, the
budget need not balance period by period, so budgetary policy in general must
specify the Entertemporal pattern of lump-sum collections and transfers.
However, with perfectly-foresighted and infinitely-lived agents, our model
exhibits the Barro-Ricardo neutrality property. Hence, we need not concern
ourselves with the intertemporal structure of budget deficits so long as the
present value of the government's net cash flow equals zero.
The presence of the aforementioned policies modifies the decision problem
for consumers in country I in two ways. First, we replace the price of good I.
in (I) by T1p, ,whereT1—l. Vith this formulation, p remains the
producer price of final good I, T2 >1represents a tariff in country 1 on
imports of consumer goods, and T2 <1represents a subsidy by country 2 on
exports of final output)-2 Second, we add the present value of net taxes to
the right-hand-side of (3) as a lump-sum addition to consumer wealth. The
amount of this collection or redistribution will differ across countries
according to their policies.
These modifications do not affect (4), which continues to describe the
optimal interteisporal pattern of expenditures for consumers worldwide as a
function of the pattern of equilibrium interest rates. In a steady state with
e—0, (4) reduces to
(30)
12 The effects of acountry 2 import tariff and a country I export
subsidy can be derived symmetrically, so we neglect these policies here and
leave the maximand for consumers in country 2 as before.30
Notice that (30) implies that in any steady state in which countries grow at
the same rate, long-run equalization of interest rates obtains. This property
of our model holds irrespective of the presence or absence of international
capital mobility, and the presence or absence of tariffs or export subsidies
on final goods and subsidies to research and development.
Turning to the production side, our policies do not alter equations (7)-
(12) describing pricing and output relationships in the intermediate and final
goods sectors and the technology for knowledge creation. However, R&D
subsidies do change the private cost of R&D. We replace (14) by
(14') c1 —wlathj/nSi
where S1 > 1 represents subsidization of research costs in country i. It also
proves convenient to redefine our numeraire to normalize for the effectof the
R&Dsubsidyon the price of intermediate inputs in country 1. Ournew
normalization dictates a modified equation for the price of intermediates
produced in country 2 as well. Together, these relationships, which replace
(l7a) and (17b) can be written as
(17') p11 —
Asfor the market-clearing conditions, the factor-markets equation (16)
is not affected, but we must replace (15) by
(IS') p1Y1 — +s12E231
where E1 denotes aggregate spending by consumers in country I, and the shares
of spending devoted to good I by residents of country 1 and country 2 are
sjs(Py. p52T2) and t2j(Py1'p52),respectively. Although import
tariffs and export subsidies on final goods do not affect steady-state
producer prices of final output in our modelj3 the direct response of
spending shares in country I to changes in trade policy must now be treated
explicitly for utility functions with an elasticity of substitution between
the final goods other than unity. Moreover. R&D subsidies, if introduced at
different rates in the two countries, will affect the steady-state value of
i1/2. and may influence, therefore, the long-run spending shares in both
countries.
This completes the necessary modifications of the equilibrium
relationships. We can now use the extended model to derive the equations
describing steady-state equilibrium in the presence of policy intervention.
In a steady state, employment in the R&Dsectoris given by athLnL/n —
agj.Making use of (8), (9), (Il), (30), (14') and (17') (which together
imply c—O in a steady state), we find employment in the manufacture of
middle products equal to aa1(g÷p)(c-l)/S. Substitution of these terms
into (16) yields the steady-state labor-market-clearing condition,
(31) +(c-l)(i-p),+1-fl —
i abS1
where q1.p1Y/n. Next, from (8)-(1l), (30), and (17') we obtain
(32) (c-l)(+p) (x!A?t]
-fi E14— 0
13 This statement can be verified using equations (7), (8) and (17').32
Naturally, we also require
(33) S à —
Finally.(15') implies
(34) — +
Itis straightforward. now, to verify that (31)-(34) imply (25) and (26) when
t—S—l for i—l,2 (with e—Se±). This provides a consistency check on the
extended model with policy instruments.
A complete solution to the model requires specification of the deter-
minants of the cross-country composition of world spending; i.e., e for
i—l,2. For this, we need to distinguish between alternative csses based on
the presence or absence of international capital mobility. When international
capital flows are ruled out, steady-state spending per middle product by
consumers in each country is proportional to the sum of that country's (per-
product) labor income, operating profits, and net transfers from the
government (including interest on internal debt). When capital flows do take
place, on the other hand, spending per product is proportional to the sumof
these components of income plus income on net foreign asset holdings. In this
latter case, it is not possible to calculate the comparative dynamic response
of to a policy change without accounting for the effects of that change on
foreign debt accumulation along the entire trajectory leading to the steady
state, Fortunately, the long-run responses to "small" doses of policy do not
depend on whether or not financial assets are tradable, so there is no need33
for us to deal in what follows with the entire equilibrium trajectory.
We consider trade policies first. From (34), the ratio q1/q2 satisfies
(35) 1 — 111ë1+&12e2
q221é1/T2 +
Now,for given expenditure levels e,equations(31)-(33) and (35) -- which
constitute asystemof five equations- - provide asolution for
(g,c11o2,q11q2).Inthis system, thetradepolicy parameters appear only in
(35). Therefore, the long'run effects of trade policy depend only on their
effects on 41iâ, taking into account the induced adjustment in the spending
levels e1 and e2. Moreover, for small trade policies (i.e. with an initial
value of T2—l), the spending shares are equal across countries (s11—s12), so
the effect on q1/q2 of changes in the cross-country composition of aggregate
spending "washes out".
Further inspection of (35) reveals that an increasa in T2 starting from
free trade with T2—l (i.e., a small import tariff in country 1) unambiguously
raises 1142J4 A tariff shifts demand by residents of country 1 toward home
consumer products, and since relative producer prices do not change in the
long run, steady-staterelativequantities must adjust. The effect of this
14 The easiest way to see this is to write the right-hand-side of (35) as
'71.2)(#1(f1.T2f52)e1+ +
where#(') is minus the partial derivative of v(') from (I) with respect to its
argumentdivided by v(•). Then an increase in T2with constantclearly
raises demand for final good 1 in country I (the first component of the
bracketed term in the numerator increases) and lowers the demand there for
finalgood 2 (the first component of the bracketed term in the denominator
falls).34
change on the steady state is quslitatively the same asfor an exogenous
increase in world preference for final good 1, such aa we studied inthe
previous section when we varied s. Similarly, a small export subsidyin
country 2 (a reduction in T2 to a value slightly below one)biases country 1
demand in favor of foreign final output. So we may apply directly our results
from proposition I to state:
proposition 4: The imposition of a small tariff on imports of final goods
reduces a country's steady-state share in middle products and R&D. It
increases the rate of long-run growth in the world economy if and only if the
country has comparative disadvantage in R&D.
oppsition 5: The provision of a small export subsidy for consumer products
reduces a country's steady-state share in middle products and R&D. It
increases the rste of long-run growth in the world economy if and only if the
country has comparative disadvantage in R&D.
Commercial policies 4affectlong-run growth rates in our model. They do so
by shifting resources in the policy-active country out of the growth-
generating activity (R&D) and into production in the favored sector. At the
same time, a resource shift of the opposite kind takes place abroad in the
dynamic general equilibrium. The net effect on world growth hinges on the
identity of the country that favors its consumer-good industry. If import
protection or export promotion is undertaken by the country that is relatively
less efficient in conducting R&D. then growth accelerates; otherwise, growth
decelerates.35
Next, we investigate the effects of small subsidies to R&D, introduced
from an Initial position ofla1sse faire. For these policyexperiments, T2—l
before and after the policy change, so the expenditure levels e1 cancel from
(35). Suppose first that both countries apply substdie at equal ad valorem
rates; i.e., S1—S2—S. In this case, relative prices of final output do not
change across steady states. Therefore, the spending shares do not
change. In Appendix C we totally differentiate (3l)-(33) and (35) with
respect to S to prove:
Prooosition 6: A small R&D subsidy by both countries at a common rate
increase the rate of long-run growth in the world economy.
This proposition is not surprising, and corresponds to a similar result for
the closed economy derived by Romer (1988). Since R&D represents the only
source of gains in per capita income in our model, stimulation of this
activity promotes growth.
Whatismore interesting, perhaps, is the effect of a small R&D subsidy
in a single country. As for bilateral subsidies, a unilateral subsidy
promotes growth by bringing more resources into product development in the
policy-active country. But now, relative final-good prices change, so the
spending shares in (35) must be allowed to vary unless the utility function
has a Cobb-Douglas forn. Depending on whether the elasticity of substitution
between final products exceeds or falls short of one, this induced change in
the pattern of spending can be conducive to or detrimental to growth.
Moreover, an R&Dsubsidyin a single country will alter therelativeshares of
the two countries in product development. If the subsidy is introduced by the36
country that is relatively less efficient at performing R&D.this effect too
can impede growth. In Appendix D we show, by means of a numerical example
using a Cobb-Douglas utility function, that an R&D subsidy introduced bythe
country with comparative disadvantage in R&D might (but need not)reduce the
world's growth rate. We also prove in Appendix C that, for the case of
constant spending shares, an R&D subsidy must encourage growth if it is
undertaken by the country with comparative advantage in R&D. Thus we have
Proposition 7 The provision of a subsidy to R&D in one country increases
long-run growth if spending shares on the two final goods are constant andthe
policy is undertaken by the country with comparative advantage in R&D.
Otherwise, the long-run growth rate may rise or fall.
VI. Lassinthe Diffusion of Knowledse
We have assumed above that research and development creates as a by-
product an addition to the stock of knowledge that facilitates subsequent R&D.
Moreover, we supposed that the knowledge so created becomes available
immediately to scientists and engineers worldwide. We now relax the latter
assumption, in recognition of the fact that privately created knowledge, even
if non-appropriable, may enter the public domain via an uneven and time-
consuming process. Also, since legal and cultural barriers may inhibit the
free movement of people and ideas across national borders, we shall allow here
for the possibility that information generated in one country disseminates
more rapidly to researchers in the same country than it does to researchers in
the trade partner country. We shall use the extended model to reconsider the
effects of trade policies on the steady-state rate of growth.3/
in place of our earlier assumption that world knowledge accumulates
exactly at the rate of product innovation (eq. 13)), we suppose now that R&D
expenditurescontribute to country-specific stocks of knowledge according to
(13t) I(1(t) —Ahfe'n1(r>+AJ' et)nj(,)dr
whereK(t) is the stock of knowledge capital at time t in country I. With
this specification, the contribution of a particular R&D project to general
knowledge is spread over time. At the moment after completion of the project.
none of its findings have percolated through the scientific and professional
community. After an infinite amount of time has passed, the R&D project
makes, as before, a unit contribution to knowledge. After finite time, the
contribution lies between these extremes of zero and one, as given by the
exponential lag structure in (13t). The parameters Ab and (with Ak
distinguish within-country and cross-country rates of diffusion.
The introduction of lags in the diffusion of knowledge alters two of the
fundamental equations of the model. First, (12) becomes
(l2f) n —LajKj/a,j
Second,we have in place of (14),
(14t) c1 —
Since these two equations are the only ones in the development of the model in
which the productivity parameter aL,,I appears, the change in specification38
compels us to substitute ath/Kl for aLflL/n in all equilibriumrelationships
where the latter term appeared formerly.
In a steady state with n1—n2—g. we have n1(r) —n1(t)e5(Tt).so that
i(1(t) — n1(t)+n(t)
(36) — +a] n(t)
—
Soin the steady state, knowledge in each country once again is proportional
to the total number of middle products, but the factor of proportionalityhas
become country-specific and endogenous. This means that the steady state
labor-input coefficient for R&D in country i, a1/s, also is endogenous:
i.e., relative productivity in R&D depends now not only on relativenatural
abilities in performing this activity, but also on relative cumulative
experience in research, as summarized by the at's. This considerationleads
us to draw a distinction henceforth between natural and acquired comparative
advantage in R&D.
From (36) we see that, when AhAf -.(i.e., when diffusion lags a very
short), p1—p2 •1,and the extended model reverts to the earlier formulation.
For AhAf finite, p1—p2, so that the ratio of the natural-plus-acquired
productivity parameters for each country is the same as for the natural
productivity parameters alone. In this case, the pattern of comparative
advantage cannot be reversed by endogenous learning, and all results from
before continue to apply. We concentrate here on cases in which the rates of39
diffusionare unequalbutthe difference between them is small.15
We derive the long-run effects of trade policy in the extended model
using equations (31)-(33) and (35), but with S1—S2—l (no R&Dsubsidies),with
b1 replaced by b1/" (natural plus acquired comparative advantage in place of
just natural comparative advantage), and with h replaced by (natural
plus acquired effective labor in place of natural effective labor). For
clarity of exposition, we shall also assume for the remainder of this section
that the spending shares s are constant. Recall that this assumption
corresponds to taking static preferences as Cobb-Douglas.
The new elements that diffusion lags introduce to the analysts of policy
stem from the effects of relative sire and demand-side bias. Before
considering these new aspects, let us suppose that labor forces are equal and
demand for the two final goods is symmetric. By totally differentiating the
system of steady-state equations (see Appendix E), we establish
Proposition8; Suppose L1—L2,s1—s2,a1—a2 and A,,-). small. Then a
tariffon imports of final goods in country 1. raises thelong-run growth rate
if and only if > a,,3.
In this case, the effects of acquired comparative advantage necessarily
reinforce those of natural comparative advantage. The country that is
A large difference between the within-country and across-country
rates of diffusion may imply that, in the steady-state equilibrium, all R&D is
carried out by one country. Such specialization, which is common in models
with a national component to increasing returns to scale, necessarily occurs
here if static preferences are Cobb-Douglas and A—O (i.e., all spi].lovers are
internal). Then, the equations that we have developed to describe the steady-
state equilibrium (which presume non-specialization in each country) would not
be valid.40
relatively moreproductivein creating new blueprints will attain, in the
steady-state equilibrium prior to the introduction of policy, a aaiajorttyshare
of the world's middle products. By its greater concentration in R&D,itwill
gain more experience in research and attain a higher steady-statestock of
knowledge. Thus, the effects of learning will augent its initial comparative
advantage in R&D. Then, when policy isintroducedin one country or the
other, the implications of the dynamic resource reallocation for the global
efficiency of R&D will be all the more significant.
Now suppose that the two countries differ initially only in (effective)
size, as measured by h. Recall that, with equal rates of diffusion, a small
tariff in either country does not affect the long-run rate of growth. We find
now, however,
Proposition 9: Suppose b1—b2. s1—s2 and -A small. Then a small tariff on
imports of final goods raises the long-run growth rate if and only if the
policy is introduced by the country with the relatively smaller effective
labor force.
Here, the larger country will come to acquire comparative advantage in
R&D, though it starts with none. The reason is as follows. With differential
rates of diffusion, knowledge takes on the characteristics of a local public
g. The larger country will have more (effective) scientists to benefit
from this non-excludable good as its share in world R&D exceeds one half. So
it acquires over time a relatively larger knowledge base and hence a
relatively more productive corps of researchers. Trade policy that serves Co
divert resources away from the R&D sector in the larger country once41
comparative advantage has been established must be detrimental to growth.
The effects of demand-size bias are similar. Wehave
Prooosicipn 10:Suppose b1—b2. h1—h2 and A,-A small. Then a smalL tariff on
imports of final goods raises the long-run growth rate if and only if the
policy is introduced in the country whose final good captures a majority share
of world spending.
The argument should be apparent. The country whose good is in relatively
greater demand must devote relatively more of its resources to final-goods
production. Thus, its R&D sector initially will be smaller. This country
develops over time a comparative disadvantage in R&D, as its learning lags
that in its trade partner country. Protection in this country will improve
world efficiency of R&Dandthereby speed growth.
Once we allow for lags in the diffusion of scientific knowledge an
differential speeds of diffusion within versus between countries we finda
richer set of possibilities for the long-run effects of trade policy.
Comparative advantage continues to play a critical role in determining whether
policy in one country will speed or decelerate growth. But comparative
advantage now must be interpreted with care, since its measure combines
natural ability and the (endogenous) benefits from cumulative experience.16
Since steady-state productivity in R&D varies positively with the size of the
R&Dsector,all determinants of the equilibrium allocation of resources to
16 Endogenous comparative advantage also plays a central role in
Krugman's (1987) analysis of commodity-specific learning-by-doing. There, as
here, productivity increases with cumulative experience. But each good is
produced in only one country in Krugutan's model, so long-run comparative
advantage is fully determined by the initial pattern of specialization.42
this sector come to be important in the analysis of policy.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed a dynamic, two-country model of trade and
growth in which long-run productivity gains stem from the profit-maximizing
behavior of entrepreneurs. We have studied the determinants of R&D. where
research bears fruit in the form of designs for new intermediate products and
in making further research less costly. New intermediate products permit
greater specialization in the process of manufacturing consumer goods, thereby
enhancing productivity in final production. In order to highlight the role of
endogenous technological improvements as a source of growth, we have
abstracted entirely from factor accumulation. But Romer (1988) has shown that
capital accumulation can be introduced into a model such as the one we have
studied without affecting the analysis in any significant way.
The interesting features of our analysis arise due to the assumed
presence of cross-country differences in efficiency at R&D and manufacturing-
Considerations of comparative advantage in research versus manufacturing of
intermediate goods bear importantly on the Implications of economic structure
and economic policy for long-run patterns of specialization and long-run rates
of growth. We find, for example, that growth in world resources or
improvements in R&D efficiency need not speed the rate of steady-state growth,
if those changes occur predominantly in the country with comparative
disadvantage in R&D. Similarly, shifts in preferences in favor of the final
good produced by the country with comparative advantage in R&D will reduce the
long-run rate of world growth.
Concerning policy, we find for the first time a link between trade43
intervention and long-run growth. Any (small) trade policy that switches
spending toward the consumer good produced by the country with comparative
advantage In R&D will cause long-run growth rates to decline. Subsidies to
R&D will accelerate growth when applied at equal rates in both countries, but
need not do so if introduced only in the country with comparative disadvantage
in R&D. When knowledge spillovers occur with a time lag and diffusion is
faster within the country of origin than across national borders, comparative
advantage becomes endogenous. Once we recognize that comparative advantage
can be acoutred as well as natural, we find a role for country size and
demand-size bias in determining the long-run effects of policy.
Our emphasis on comparative advantage in research and development
highlights only one channel through which trade structure and commercial
policy might affect long-run growth. In other contexts, the trade environment
might influence the rate of accumulation of human capital or the rate at which
a technologically lagging (less developed) country adopts for local use the
existing off-the-shelf techniques of production. Investigation of the links
between trade regime and these other sources of growth seems to us a worthy
topic for future research.44
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